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MAIN STAFF OF THE
ARMY OF REPUBLIKA SRPSKA /VRS/
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NATIONAL DEFENCE
STATE SECRET
SADEJSTVO /coordination/ 95

VERY URGENT

To the commands of the 1st KK /Krajina Corps/, IBK /Eastern Bosnia Corps/, DK /Drina Corps/, V /Air Force/ and PVO /Anti-aircraft Defence/ (to the 2nd KK /Krajina Corps/, SRK /Sarajevo-Romanija Corps/ and HK /Herzegovina Corps/, for their information).

D I R E C T I V E
FOR FURTHER OPERATIONS, Operative No. 7/1

1. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION

Since the start of the year, but particularly during the second half of March, Muslim armed forces have started wantonly violating in a synchronised manner the Agreement on a Four-month Cessation of Hostilities, focussing on offensive actions in the wider area of Bihać and Vlašić, in the zone of operations of the 30th Infantry Division and Task Group 2 of the 1st Krajina Corps, and on Majeвица mountain, as well as regrouping and bringing in new forces to continue offensive actions in Posavina, towards Teslić and Srbobran.

In synchronised activities, forces of the Muslim-Croatian Federation, forces of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ and units of the HV /Croatian Army/ are waiting for the result of the struggle on the Vlašić plateau and on Majeвица, and in the event of a favourable development of the situation will join in with the aim of cutting the corridor and taking control of the Posavina, continuing operations in the direction of Glamoč and Grahovo, and, in cooperation with Muslim forces, taking Šipovo and Jajce.

Forces of the 2nd Corps of the so-called BH Army, composed of the following seven divisions and staff support units: the 21st Infantry Division with its KM /Command Post/ in Srebrenik (213th Motorised Brigade - Gradačac, 215th Motorised Brigade - Gornji Rahić, 212th Brigade - Gradačac, 216th Brigade - Čelić, and 225th Brigade - Srebrenik); the 22nd Infantry Division with its KM in Gračanica (111th and 212th Brigades - Gračanica, 109th Brigade - Klokotnica, 112th Brigade - Zelina Donja, and 117th and 118th Brigades - Lukavac); the 23rd Infantry Division with its KM in Kladanj (1st Olovo Brigade, 1st Podrinje Brigade and 121st Brigade - Kladanj); the 24th Infantry Division with its KM in Kalesija (1st Teočak Brigade, 205th Brigade - Kalesija, and 206th Brigade - Sapna); the 25th Infantry Division with its KM in Tuzla (251st *Tabut* /Muslim coffin/ Brigade, 242nd Brigade, 1st and 2nd Light Infantry Brigades and 3rd Infantry Brigade - Tuzla); 26th Infantry Division with its KM in

00898421

Živinice (119th and 122nd Brigades – Banovići, 210th and 216th Brigades - Živinice, 220th Brigade – Djurdjevik, and the *Živiničke Ose* /Živinice Wasps/ Detachment; the 28th Light Infantry Division with its KM in Srebrenica (280th, 282nd and 283rd Ilbr /expansion unknown/, 281st and 284th IBlbr /Eastern Bosnia Light Brigade/, the Srebrenica sb /Independent Battalion/ - Srebrenica, and the 1st Žepa Light Brigade - Žepa) and staff support units (the Engineers' Brigade, Military Police Battalion, the "Mujahedin" Brigade, and the VZD /expansion unknown/ Group – Tuzla), with a total strength of 65,850 soldiers, are making intensive preparations, bringing in and grouping forces on tactical operational axes leading towards Majevisa, Brčko, Modriča, Doboj, Vozuća and Zvornik, with the probable objective of cutting off forces on Ozren and taking over Doboj, cutting RS /Republika Srpska/ territory in the wider area of Zvornik and, in coordination with HVO forces and regular HV forces, cutting RS territory in the area of Brčko and taking over the Posavina.

Other details of the intentions and possibilities of enemy forces are in Directive No.7 and daily intelligence reports of the VRS Main Staff.

2. THE TASK OF THE VRS

On the basis of Directive No. 7, the VRS has the task: (1) with extremely persistent defence to defend RS territory on all fronts, and with decisive defence on the north-western and south-western part of the Sarajevo front prevent at all costs the lifting of the blockade of Sarajevo and the cutting of the Sarajevo-Trnovo-Kalinovik road; (2) to stop deeper enemy breakthroughs of the "Bihać-Kupres and Vlačić" type on any fronts, but particularly north of Zvornik, on Majevisa and Vozuća, in the Posavina towards Brčko and Modrica, near Teslić and Srbobran; (3) by organised and planned conduct of combat operations, to inflict on the enemy the highest possible losses in men and materiel.

The VRS Main Staff and the commands of the 1st KK, IBK, DK and V and PVO will immediately commence planning and making organised preparations for the realisation of the *Sadejstvo* /Coordination/ 95 strategic operation.

3. With the wanton violation of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities and the current offensive by Muslim armed forces on Vlačić and Majevisa, and due to the tacit consent and support of the USA and the open material and verbal support of Islamic countries for offensive combat operations, the international community and representatives of the Contact Group find themselves in a dead-end street, without definite ideas or practical solutions for stopping the war in the territory of the former BH.

From individual initiatives and statements by individual representatives of the Contact Group, and through meetings with the highest representatives of Russia, Serbia, Croatia and the former BH, an attempt is being made to find the most suitable formula for enabling the continuation of the negotiating process and halting the current offensive operations of Muslim armed forces.

In zones where Muslim armed forces are conducting combat operations, all activities and movements of UNPROFOR are blocked by the Muslims, while on the other hand representatives of NATO and UNPROFOR openly threaten to use aviation in the

00898422

event of attacks by our forces on so-called "protected zones". This tendentious and contradictory behaviour by responsible representatives of NATO and UNPROFOR towards the conflicting parties is probably the result of pressure from the USA, Germany and Islamic countries, but is also due to the prevailing fear of the possible elimination of the Muslim enclaves in RS territory and the creation of a compact territory in the eastern part of the RS.

Regardless of the future course of events and the escalation of the conflict, the engagement of UNPROFOR land forces and NATO forces is unlikely to happen, unless they are directly physically threatened.

4. I HAVE DECIDED TO: Conduct with the VRS main forces (1st KK, IBK, DK, V and PVO) a strategic operation under the code-name *Sadejstvo 95*, with the basic objective of inflicting the heaviest possible losses on the enemy, restoring the reputation of the VRS among the people and in the world, and forcing the enemy to negotiate and end the war at the achieved lines through successful actions by VRS forces along chosen axes.

Stabilise the defence on the north-western and south-eastern parts of the 2nd KK front, in the zone of responsibility of the 30th Infantry Division, and, through energetic operations in the wider area of Vlašić, win back lost positions and create conditions for a continuation of the attack towards Travnik and Bugojno.

With forces of the IBK and the DK, with reinforcements from the HK and the SRK, complete as soon as possible tasks from Operation *Spreča 95*, cut off and destroy enemy forces east of the Vis-Stolice line and in this way create conditions for continuing the attack towards Tuzla and Živinice with this goal: with synchronised actions by forces of the 1st KK, the IBK and the DK from the areas of Ozren, Majeвица and across Sprečko polje break through to the Turija-Modrac lake- Živinice-Gornja Gračanica line, cut off the forces of the 2nd Corps of the so-called BH Army and thereby create optimal conditions for concentric action from the wider area of the Posavina and Trebava aimed at widening the corridor, removing the threats from Doboј and Brčko and preventing Muslim armed forces using the Dubrava airfield for military purposes.

Carry out the operation in three phases:

- In the first phase of the operation, cut off and destroy Muslim armed forces east of the Vis-Stolice line, i.e., complete tasks from Operation *Spreča 95*, recapture lost territory and stabilise the defence on Vlašić and in the zone of the 30th Infantry Division.
- In the second phase of the operation, through fast and energetic actions from the wider area of Ozren and Majeвица, the introduction of strong armoured mechanised forces along Sprečko polje, the correct choice of manoeuvre and the bypassing of bigger inhabited places, break through as soon as possible to the eastern shore of Lake Modrac and in this way cut off Muslim forces north of the Modrac village-Breza-Živinice-Ravno hill (trig point 1019) line.
- In the third phase of the operation, using the results of operations in Sprečko polje, through concentrated operations along chosen axes from the wider area of Posavina and Trebava, widen the Posavina corridor, cut off and destroy Muslim forces in the

00898423

wider areas of Gradačac, Gračanica and south-west of Brčko, and in this way widen the corridor and finally remove the threat of a breakthrough from Doboј and the joining up of coalition forces in the Brčko area, thereby forcing the Muslim leadership to accept an end to the war at the achieved lines.

Other forces of the VRS shall contribute to the conduct of Operation *Sadejstvo 95* with the goal of operative strategic camouflage and correcting the operative tactical position, by carrying out planned combat, battles and operations in accordance with Directive No. 7 and active combat operations towards Bugojno, Travnik, Kladanj, Olovo and Vareš and around the Srebrenica, Žepa and Goražde enclaves and the Bihać pocket.

By decisive defence on the north-west and south-west of the Sarajevo front and on axes leading towards Grahovo, Glamoč, Šipovo, Teslić, Nevesinje, Kalinovik and Trnovo, prevent a breakthrough by coalition forces and the cutting of important communications or the achievement of a deeper breakthrough of the Bihać-Kupres-Vlašić type.

Support from the Air Force and PVO with available forces and resources and the VRS RG /expansion unknown/.

IKM /Forward Command Post/ of the VRS at the KM of the IBK in Bijeljina.

Preparation and planning of the operation to start immediately.

Complete Operation *Spreča 95* during April and tasks from Operation *Sadejstvo 95* approximately by mid-May 1995.

5. TASKS OF UNITS

5.1 1st Krajina Corps: prevent an enemy breakthrough within range of the operative tactical axes by decisive defence of the border with the Republic of Croatia in the zone of responsibility of the 30th Infantry Division, the 9th Operative Group (Task Group 2 and part of the forces of the Ozren Task Group), and, by active operations on the rest of the front, tie down as many of his forces as possible, to recapture in the first stage of the operation lost territory on Vlašić, to stabilise the defence and create conditions for continuing active combat operations towards Travnik and Bugojno.

In the second phase of the operation, regroup forces in the Posavina, Trebava and Ozren area and then, in coordination with forces of the IBK, the DK, Air Force and PVO, liberate the area /?between/ the rivers Spreča and Turija, breaking through to the line from Turija village to Modrac village.

In the third phase of the operation, exploiting the results achieved south of Tuzla (in Sprečko polje), by applying an appropriate manoeuvre and operative tactical camouflage, execute an energetic attack along chosen axes and break through to the Gračanica-Soko-Hrgovi donji line, thereby widening the corridor, eliminating the threat from Doboј, shortening the frontline and freeing forces for continuation of the attack.

00898424

Support from the Air Force, PVO and VRS RG /expansion unknown/.

Corps IKM to be decided by the Corps Commander.

5.2 The 2nd Eastern Bosnia Corps: through decisive defence on the border with the Republic of Croatia and in cooperation with forces of the 1st KK, prevent the breakthrough and linking up of coalition forces in the wider area of Brčko. By completing tasks from Operation *Spreča 95*, in cooperation with the DK in the first stage of the operation, break through as quickly as possible to the Banj hill-Kalesija line, then regroup forces and, in cooperation with the DK, the 1st KK and the Air Force and PVO, through a suitable manoeuvre taking in and bypassing larger populated areas and by introducing strong armoured and mechanised forces on chosen axes, the main forces of the Corps shall in the second and third phases of the operation execute an energetic attack along the chosen directions and cut off Muslim armed forces north of the Površnica-Simin han- Breza village line, while the Corps' auxiliary forces, in cooperation with forces of the 1st KK, shall conduct active combat operations on the rest of the front with the aim of inflicting the greatest possible losses, tying down enemy forces and widening the corridor.

Support from the Air Force and PVO.

Corps IKM to be decided by the Corps Commander.

5.3 The Drina Corps: Prevent an enemy breakthrough along selected operative tactical axes with persistent defence and active combat actions on the north-west part of the front and around the enclaves, and tie down as many enemy troops as possible through diversionary actions and operative tactical camouflage measures.

In cooperation with the IBK, complete tasks from Operation *Spreča 95* as soon as possible and break through in the first phase of the operation to the Vis-Kalesija line, then regroup forces and in the second and third phases of the operation, in cooperation with forces of the IBK, 1st KK, Air Force and PVO, by an appropriate manoeuvre, infiltrating strong groups into the enemy rear and introducing strong armoured mechanised forces, execute an attack in the general direction Kalesija-Dubrava-Tuzla, reaching as soon as possible the Šerići village-Živinice-Jasičak-Ravno hill line, thereby cutting off forces of the 2nd Corps of the so-called BH Army south of that line.

Support from the Air Force and PVO.

Corps IKM to be decided by the Corps Commander.

5.4 Air Force and Anti-aircraft Defence: In agreement with the commands of the 1st KK, IBK and DK, complete planning and reconnoitre features for execution of a massive strike, following the start of the operation and on the approval of the VRS Main Staff. Then concentrate offensive air support as requested along the main axis of attack in line with the requests of the corps commanders and approval of the VRS Main Staff.

Plan helicopter support and organise by redistributing combat and transport helicopters along the main and secondary axes, with the emphasis on support for forces of the Eastern Bosnia Corps and the Drina Corps.

In coordination with units of the Air Force, 1st KK, IBK and DK, organise a single system of air defence in the zone of operations, focussing on protecting forces and important facilities on the main axis of attack.

Through a suitable choice of firing positions for the *Volhov* PVO rp /?rocket regiment/, secure anti-aircraft forces and facilities on the main axis of attack – from Kalesija to Tuzla – and simultaneous rocket support against important targets and facilities on the ground.

IKM at the IKM of the VRS Main Staff in Bijeljina.

5.5 The 2nd KK Corps, SRK and HK: Plan and execute tasks given in Directive No. 7.

6. SUPPORT FOR COMBAT ACTIONS

6.1 Moral and psychological support: Before the start of the operation, acquaint all participants with the objective and decisive importance of this operation for finally defeating enemy forces and forcing them to join the peace process and the end of the war in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Through planned and coordinated informative and propaganda activities with state organs and media institutions, expose the bias of UNPROFOR and the international community, which are allowing the enemy to arm freely and continually attack Serbian defensive positions from the “protected zone” of Tuzla.

Devote special attention to providing timely and objective information on the condition and intentions of the enemy, our surroundings, the situation at the front and the results of combat actions during the operation. Without fail, directly prepare soldiers morally and psychologically, with special emphasis on the importance of the task they have to complete, the difficulties and dangers that could arise during the course of combat actions while performing their task, and our advantages. After completion of the task, briefly analyse the degree of success, stressing positive examples and weaknesses which should be overcome in future actions.

Promote mutual trust and security among soldiers, and particularly responsibility towards adjacent units in battle and the rendering of assistance to wounded soldiers. All forms of inappropriate behaviour, panic and spreading of rumours which negatively affect discipline and the overall mood of the soldiers should be promptly and effectively punished.

Coordinate giving of information to the public about combat actions in the operation and psychological and propaganda activities directed against the enemy through the Centre for Information and Propaganda Activities of the VRS Main Staff.

00898428

6.2 Intelligence support: Focus intelligence support on collecting data on the strength, organisation and intentions of the enemy, and especially on the introduction of enemy forces into the zone of the 2nd Corps of the so-called BH Army and the 4th Military District of the HVO, particularly the areas of Majeвица, the Orašje bridgehead, the northern edge of Sprečko polje, Gračanica and Gradačac.

From reconnaissance units at all levels, form intelligence organs exclusively for specialised tasks and keeping one third in reserve, with the goal of collecting data on enemy activities and discovering intervention and specialist forces expected to arrive from other parts of the front, engaging for this intelligence organs at all levels of the command and control system.

6.3 Security support: With the goal of complete and effective securing of the execution of the operation, the responsible organs of the VRS Main Staff and subordinate commands will take all security measures, focussing on preserving security, preparing and executing the operation and preventing the leaking of military secrets.

For the sake of counter-intelligence protection of the operation, acquaint all those involved in preparing and carrying out the operation with only the essential details, classify documents relating to its conduct as state secrets and treat them accordingly. When using communications systems, adhere strictly to cryptographic protection procedures and limit the use of hand-held and other non-secure radio equipment to the essential minimum, taking care that the enemy is definitely not listening in. Plan and organise the work of a decoy radio network at the level of the VRS Main Staff and the corps commands.

Forbid participants in the operation from using the public telephone system or contacting unauthorised persons in other ways during the preparation and actual conduct /of the operation/. Military police organs of the 1st KK, IBK and DK shall, in cooperation with organs of the RS MUP /Ministry of the Interior/, strictly forbid the movement and presence in their zones of responsibility of members of UNPROFOR and workers of the UNHCR, ICRC and other international organisations whose activities have been noted by intelligence. Strictly forbid the presence of foreign journalists and other such persons in the zone of preparation, build-up of forces and conduct of the operation. Ban the work of radio amateurs in the zone of conduct of the operation, except for cases of planned misleading of the enemy.

6.4. Engineering support: the focus of engineering support should be on safeguarding movement and fortifying the achieved lines. Devote particular attention to the timely opening of paths through our own obstacles and obstacles placed by the enemy in front of the forward positions, and to organisation of the KZS /Control and Protection Service/

Provide engineering support from our own forces and resources. The commands of the corps which bear the weight of the offensive combat actions shall regulate the formation of temporary GZ /groups for erecting obstacles/ and PGZ /mobile groups for erecting obstacles/ in their zones of responsibility. Erect obstacles on the achieved lines using our own and additional mines and explosives. The VRS Main Staff will

00898427

approve /the issue of/ mines and explosives for erection of obstacles and for demolition in response to specific demands and availability.

6.5 PNHBO /Anti-Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Protection/: the focus of PNHBO should be in the zones of responsibility of the Eastern Bosnia Corps and the Drina Corps. Complete in time all planned measures and activities for the protection of personnel, technical and materiel resources, water, food and other goods from the effects of chemical weapons. Pay particular attention to the application of tactical operative measures of RHB /Radiological, Chemical and Biological/ protection and equip units with formational and personal equipment.

6.6 Logistics support: provide logistics support for forces engaged in the operation by relying on own resources (PB /?logistics bases/), the republican commodity reserves and the manufacturing and service industries of the territory. Commands of the participating corps, the Air Force and PVO are responsible for the overall organisation of logistics support in their zone of responsibility. Supply units engaged in the operation with materiel and technical equipment through VRS logistics bases. Expenditures of material reserves shall be approved by the VRS Main Staff, and of the republican reserves by the Supreme Command and the Government of Republika Srpska. Logistics support is to focus on the main axes of attack.

7 COMMAND

The VRS Main Staff IKM /shall be in/ Bijeljina (at the IBK KM). Organise communications in accordance with the separate order and plan of the VRS Main Staff with strict respect for standard rules on cryptographic protection.

7.1 Submission of reports

- a) Regular reports at 1900 hours, giving the situation at 1700 hours;
- b) /Reports/ on readiness for conduct of Operation *Sadejstvo 95*;
- c) Interim reports – as necessary for all important changes;
- d) Summary reports – every third day during conduct of combat operations.

8. The VRS Main Staff will elaborate the operation plan and provide extracts for subordinate commands by 15 April 1995, on the basis of which the subordinate commands will elaborate their own combat documents.

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Typed by: Pauna MITROVIĆ

COMMANDER
Colonel General
Ratko MLADIĆ
/signed and stamped/

Made in 1 (one) copy.